Dolan v. Transport Workers Union: The High Price of Free Speech for Local Elected Union Officials;Recent Developments in Public Law by Brown, William D.
Journal of Legislation
Volume 12 | Issue 2 Article 11
5-1-1985
Dolan v. Transport Workers Union: The High Price
of Free Speech for Local Elected Union
Officials;Recent Developments in Public Law
William D. Brown
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brown, William D. (1985) "Dolan v. Transport Workers Union: The High Price of Free Speech for Local Elected Union
Officials;Recent Developments in Public Law," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 12: Iss. 2, Article 11.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol12/iss2/11
DOLAN V. TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION: THE
HIGH PRICE OF FREE SPEECH FOR LOCAL
ELECTED UNION OFFICIALS
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA)1
assures union members the right to assemble and execise free speech.2 The
LMRDA also prohibits union disciplinary action against individual union mem-
bers for exercising these rights.3 In Dolan v. Transport Workers Union,4 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that despite these
provisions local elected union officials may be dismissed for exercising free
speech.5 The decision thus limits the LMRDA to pure "membership speech." 6
In the context of union patronage appointments,7 other circuits have consid-
ered the issue of whether union officials' free speech is protected by the LMRDA. 8
Since the Dolan court addressed the issue outside the patronage appointment con-
text, the potential chilling effect on free speech has broader implications.
This recent development piece contends that although the Eleventh Circuit
correctly decided the case on the basis of existing law,9 policy considerations
compel the adoption of new legislation which adequately protects the free speech
of elected local union officials. Accordingly, the piece first analyzes the court's
decision. It then discusses the policy implications and submits proposals for legis-
lative reform.
DOLAN v. TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
The Facts
Ms. Dolan was elected President of Local 553 (the Local) of the Transport
1. 73 Stat. 519 (1959) amended by 79 Stat. 888 (1965), 88 Stat. 852 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 401-531 (1976
& Supp. III 1979)).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (A)(2), entitled Freedom of Speech and Assembly, provides:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with
other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of
the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or
upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organizations established and
reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings. Provided, that nothing herein shall be
construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to
the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his re-
fraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal and contractual
obligations.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 529, entitled Prohibition on Certain Discipline by Labor Organizations, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop, steward, or other
representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or other-
wise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the
provisions of this chapter. The provisions of § 412 of this title shall be applicable to the en-
forcement of this section.
4. 746 F.2d 733 (1lth Cir. 1984).
5. Id. at 739.
6. Id.
7. A patronage appointment occurs when an elected official appoints loyal supporters to positions in the
union. See, e.g., Newman v. Local 1101, Communication Workers of America, 570 F.2d 439 (2d Cir.
1978).
8. See, e.g., Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431 (1982); Newman v. Local 1101, Communication Workers of
America, 570 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1978); Adams Lundy v. Association of Professional Flight Attendants,
731 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1984).
9. See infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 44-69 and accompanying text.
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Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO (the International) on February 1, 1975."1
During Dolan's tenure, differences developed between her and several members of
the union's Executive Board.12 After suspending Dolan from her post as Local
President, the Executive Board conducted a hearing to consider her removal from
office. 13
On May 5, 1976 the Executive Board removed Dolan as President, citing mis-
appropriation of funds and failure to pay monthly dues.' 4 The Board removed
her for the balance of her elected term and prohibited her from holding any
elected office before February 1, 1978.15
Following the International Convention's denial of her appeal, 16 Dolan filed a
complaint in Federal district court seeking a temporary restraining order,
mandatory injunction against, and damages from, the International, the Local,
individual Executive Board members, and Eastern Airlines. t7 She based her
claims on sections 101 and 609 of LMRDA."8 Dolan claimed that her removal
was retribution for expressing her views on three seperate subjects of union busi-
ness. First, Dolan supported Eastern Airlines' wage freeze proposal, which the
International opposed.' 9 Second, Dolan activley supported a flight attendant's
complaint that he was allegedly struck by an Eastern Captain. 20 Third, contrary
to the wishes of the International and the Executive Board, Dolan refused to ap-
point Executive Board members to the team responsible for negotiating new con-
tracts for Eastern employees.2 '
Following a hearing, the district court dismissed Dolan's claim for injunctive
relief.22 Dolan then had her case tried for damages before a jury.23 The jury
returned a verdict in favor of four individual Board members but found against
the International, the Local, one member of the International, and four other
Board members.24
The Court's Reasoning
On appeal, the appellants argued that they dismissed Dolan from office for a
failure to pay union fees rather than for exercising her free speech.25 In the alter-
native, the appellants argued that section 101(a)(2) of the Act applies only to pure
"membership speech."' 2  The court found merit in the second argument and re-
versed the district court's judgment.27 It found that the LMRDA free speech
11. 746 F.2d at 735. Upon the election, Dolan took a leave from work as a flight attendant for Eastern
Airlines to serve as Local Union President. The President's office constitutes the only full-time, sala-
ried position with local. The Local is part of the Transport Workers Union of America. Id.
12. Id. Local 553's Executive Board consists of thirteen elected members, including the President, four
other officers, and eight members elected from various cities that Eastern services, Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 736.
18. Id. at 736-37.
19. Id. at 737.
20. Id. She requested an investigation and internal action on the matter. This brought her into sharp
disagreement with the President of Eastern as well as with several Executive Board members.
21. Id. at 738.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. Based on Dolan's LMRDA claims and a related civil conspiracy claim, the jury awarded
$95,000.00.
25. Id. at 738-39.
26. Id. at 739.
27. Id. The court found it unnecessary to address the appellants first claim in view of its decision on the
second claim. Id.
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provisions do not prohibit the dismissal of a local elected union official from office
because the dismissal infringes only upon the officer's rights as an officer and not
as a member.2" Specifically, the court held that official speech differs from member
speech when the official's speech either "advances her duties of office or interferes
with these duties. "29
The court emphasized congressional intent3 ° and prior case law31 in conclud-
ing that Congress did not intend the protections of section 101(a)(2) to prohibit
dismissal of local elected union officials.3 2 In determining the intent of Congress,
the court acknowledged democratization of the union as one of the Act's major
purposes33 but cautioned that Congress did not intend for the judicary to meddle
in unions' internal affairs. As noted by the court, 34 the Senate report accompany-
ing the Act stated: "In providing remedies for existing evils, the Senate should be
careful neither to undermine self-government within the labor movement nor to
weaken unions in their role as bargaining representatives of employees.",
31
The Eleventh Circuit also relied upon case law in interpreting section
101(a)(2). In Finnegan v. Leu, 36 the United States Supreme Court held that sec-
tion 101(a)(2) does not prohibit the dismissal of appointed local union officials for
exercising free speech. In that case the plaintiffs, union officials who had been
appointed by the previous union president, alleged that the newly elected union
president dismissed them in violation of section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA. 3' The
Supreme Court disagreed and stated that in passing section 101(a)(2) "it was rank
and file union members - not union officers or employess as such - whom
Congress sought to protect.",39 Although the Dolan court acknowledged that Fin-
negan is distinguishable because the patronage system was under attack in Finne-
gan,' the Dolan court extended the Finnegan rule to cases outside the patronage
context.
In addition to reviewing case law and Congressional intent, the court relied
upon a literal interpretation of the statute. The court noted that LMRDA con-
fers only specific, delimitable rights.4 Therefore, the court refused to extend the
Act's protection to union officials in the absence of specific statutory language
referring to officers.4 2
THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DOLAN
Initially, the Dolan decision appears to have an adverse impact only upon the
28. 746 F.2d at 742.
29. Id.
30. The court explained its emphasis on congressional intent:
We have cautioned against a literal reading of congressional labor legislation. Congressional
labor legislation is often a product of conflict between strongly held and opposed views, and its
proper construction frequently requires consideration of its wording against the background of
its legislative history and in the light of the general objectives Congress sought to achieve. The
LMRDA is no exception.
Id. at 739 n.13.
31. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
32. 746 F.2d at 742.
33. Id. at 739.
34. Id.
35. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959); reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
2318, 2322.
36. 456 U.S. 431 (1982).
37. Id. at 437.
38. Id. at 443.
39. Id. at 437.
40. 746 F.2d at 741.
41. Id. at 740.
42. Id. at 741.
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rights of union officers. Careful examination reveals, however, a more far-reach-
ing impact. The decision could limit important rights of individual union mem-
bers43 and damage the union itself."
The Impact on Members Rights
Prior to Finnegan, courts recognized that the removal of local union officials
could interfere with the rights of union members. In Schonfeld v. Penza,45 a local
union president who criticized the union was removed from office. The plaintiffs
alleged that the "[r]emoval of Schonfeld from office and the restrictions on his
subsequent eligibility constitute a form of intimidation of the membership.
46
Thus, the removal of Schonfeld, a local union president, was transformed into a
matter affecting the rights of members and the Second Circuit found jurisdiction
under section 101(a)(2).
In a later decision, Newman v. Local 1101, Communication Workers of
America,47 a shop steward who was dismissed for criticizing union policy sought
reinstatement under section 101(a)(2). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed a district court order that required a local union to reinstate the plaintiff as
shop steward. The court found that the purpose of Newman's removal was to
"stifle not only Newman but members generally from exercising their rights to
openly criticize the local's management, to publish their views, and to run for
office."
4 8
Unfortunately, it is no longer clear whether the Schonfeld and Newman deci-
sions are still valid. In Cotter v. Unions,49 an employee who complained bitterly
about safety problems at the nuclear plant where he worked was dismised from a
safety board. The district court concluded that the decision in Finnegan under-
mined the court's ability to reinstate dismissed union officials.5 ° Although the
Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision, 5' it noted that the Supreme
Court's holding in Finnegan made it unclear whether a union officer could prop-
erly be reinstated under section 101 in order to protect the rights of union mem-
bers.52 Because the Supreme Court has specifically left the question open,5 3 a
legislative response would be particularly helpful.
The Dolan decision could also have an adverse impact on the rights of union
members by diminishing the effectiveness of the grievance system. Dolan claimed
that the International dismissed her in part because she zealously pursued an
employee's grievance.54 Certain board members eventually concluded that Dolan
43. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
45. 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
46. Id. at 903.
47. 597 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1973).
48. Id. at 836.
49. 589 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
50. Id. at 328. "An order directing the union to reinstate a dissident policy making official would run
counter to the rationale of Finnegan." Id.
51. Cotter v. Owens, 118 LRRM 2451 (BNA).
52. Id. at 2456, 2453.
53. See Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 440-41 n.II (1982). In Finnegan the Court stated:
We need not decide whether the retaliatory discharge of a union member from union office -
even though not discipline under § 609 - might even give rise to a cause of action under § 101.
For whatever limits Title I places on a union's authority to utilize dismissal from union office as
'part of purposeful and deliberate attempt. . . to suppress dissent within the union,' cf Schon-
feld v. Penza, [citation omitted] it does not restrict the freedom of an elected union leader to
choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own.
Id.
54. 746 F.2d at 737.
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acted too aggressively in supporting the employee's grievance.55 The unavoidable
inference from the Dolan decision is that a local union president could be dis-
missed without redress for zealously pursuing the grievances of a member. Such a
result would be especially unwanted by union members. A survey of five local
unions revealed that the members hold the ability to win grievances as the third
most important characteristic of a local union leader.56
The Impact on the Union
One of the LMRDA's major purposes was the democratization of unions. 57
The Dolan court's decision threatens to undermine union democracy and ulti-
mately to weaken the unions. One must note that the Supreme Court's decision in
Finnegan did not encroach upon union democracy since the dismissed union offi-
cial was appointed pursuant to a system of patronage. Since Dolan was elected
president, 8 rather than appointed, her removal effectively nullified the votes of
local union members and usurped union democracy at the local union level. In-
deed, the Dolan court itself noted that the "ouster of an elected official undeniably
poses a greater potential threat to the LMRDA's broad goal of democratizing
unions than do patronage dismissals."5 9 The dismissal of an elected official may
be an even greater threat to democracy when, as in Dolan, the elected official is a
local official. A strong, vocal and independent local union leader is a key to a
democratic union' because "on the international level, the ability of members to
exchange opinions and place pressures on the leadership is limited."'"
The potential harm to unions caused by the undermining of union democracy
can, perhaps, best be understood in light of the purpose of unions. Three distinct
theories of the central institutional purpose of unions have been identified.62 The
first theory focuses on bargaining militancy.63 The second theory views the main
purpose of a union as promotion of industrial stability in labor-management rela-
tions.6" The third theory claims that a union's main duty is responsiveness to
membership desires and interests.6 5
The first theory focuses on the results of bargaining and gauges the union's66
success on the basis of the lucrativeness of union contracts. Autocratic rule is
viewed as being more effective than union democracy in achieving economic goals
because bargaining, like war, requires military discipline, not democratic rule.6 7
Autocratic rule, however, may be an inefficient tool for obtaining higher
wages, because without democracy "union leadership is not likely to have the
55. Id.
56. R. MILLER, F. ZELLER AND G. MILLER, THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL UNION LEADERSHIP 59 (1964).
Only honesty with local union members and management were valued more highly.
57. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-
Management Reporting Act, 1959, at 397, 398 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History]. One
of the recommended purposes is "to insure union democracy."
58. 746 F.2d at 741.
59. Id.
60. R. MILLER, F. ZELLER AND G. MILLER, supra note 56, at 163. "The local union officer is only one
factor determining the success of local union leadership. He is, however, an indispensable and impor-
tant factor." Id.
61. L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, THE LOCAL UNION 243 (1953).
62. James, Union Democracy, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 250 (1978).
63. P. TAFT, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS 35 (1964).
64. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 71 (1970).
65. B. COCHRAN, LABOR AND COMMUNISM 338-40 (1977). Cochran conceives of the union as the em-
ployees' representative and argues that union leadership should be responsive to employees demands
above all.
66. L. ULMAN, THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL TRADE UNION (1964). Ulman argues that unions must
have an autocratic structure in order to bargain effectively.
67. SEIDMAN, SOME REQUIREMENTS FOR UNION DEMOCRACY IN LABOR, (R. Lester ed. 1965).
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united membership necessary to back it in collective bargaining."68 In addition,
the charge that democracy undermines union bargaining strength may be over-
stated because members tend to strongly support leadership during negotiations.69
More importantly, democracy may strengthen unions by stimulating partici-
pation. A study of local unions revealed that union participation declines when
unions become less democratic. 70 This study is corroborated by several articles
that attribute high participation in unions to the effects of strong union democ-
71racy. Union participation is linked to bargaining strength because unions can
currently ill afford to lose any members72 and the decline of union membership
hampers the effectiveness of unions as bargaining representatives.73
The second theory of a union's institutional purpose focuses on the union's
duty to promote stability in labor management relations. 74 Traditional theorists
contend that union democracy disrupts industrial stability because the rank-and-
file are seen as being incapable of making sensible decisions. 75 They argue that the
workers' environment tends to make the workers radical and irrational.76 How-
ever, without democracy union leaders may become unresponsive to members
concerns, resulting in wildcat strikes and other breakdowns in the scheme of sta-
ble production.77
The third theory of a union's institutional purpose advocates the responsive-
ness of unions to employees wishes.7 ' Not suprisingly, responsive unionism is the79
theory most closely associated with union democracy. Proponents of this theory
note that the sanction of exclusive bargaining agents requires guarantees that the
views of the rank-and-file be respected. 0 Democracy is essential to a responsive
union because international officers are in constant danger of losing touch with the
viewpoints of members, and local elected officials are a key link in communication
between local members and international leaders.8 '
The threat to union democracy also may injure unions because of the link
between union democracy and union corruption.12 The primary purpose of the
LMRDA is to prevent union corruption. 3 The findings by Congress of signifi-
cant corruption in labor unions triggered the passage of the LMRDA in 1959.84
68. James, supra note 62, at 25 1. James theorizes that undemocratic unions lack the high level of partici-
pation necessary for hard bargaining.
69. Id.
70. R. MILLER, F. ZELLER & G. MILLER, supra note 56, at 24. "Democracy is also preferrable from the
point of view of the union organizer, who is interested solely in maximizing the effectiveness of his
union. Without democracy, participation falls off." Id.
71. See, e.g., Hoerr, Union Democracy and Apathy Don't Mix, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 2, 1978, at 28; Hoerr
claims that the level of union participation is directly related to the strength of the union's democratic
structure.
72. Bennett & Johnson, Pushbutton Unionism, in READINGS IN LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELA-
TIONS (R. Rowan ed. 1985).
73. Id.
74. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 64, at 71.
75. See, e.g., S. LiPSET, POLITICAL MAN 87 (1960). Lipset contends that workers are more irrational and
emotional than employers and therefore likely to take rigid and illogical positions.
76. See, e.g., R. HOXIE, TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 179 (1917). Hoxie states: "They
[workers] have nothing to lose - no responsibility."
77. James, supra note 62, at 252.
78. Lipset, The Law and Trade Union Democracy, 47 VA. L. REV. 1, 50 (1961).
79. James, supra note 62, at 253.
80. Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 609 (1959).
81. See L. SAYLES AND G. STRAUSS, supra note 61, at 243.
82. Corrupt unions are frequently synonymous with undemocratic unions. See, e.g., James, supra note 62,
at 353.
83. See Legislative History, supra note 57, at 407.
84. Id. at 407. "The committee-reported bill is primarily designed to correct the abuses which have crept
into labor." Id.
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The Senate Report accompanying the Act reveals that Congress sought to combat
union corruption primarily by strengthening union democracy. 5
Unfortunately, union corruption remains a significant problem.86 A recent
Senate Report on organized crime revealed that although most unions are not
corrupt, several unions are partially corrupt and a few remain fundamentally cor-
rupt.° The Senate Report also revealed that organized crime has been able to
gain control of a union governing board similar to the executive board that dis-
missed Dolan.88 Consequently, an honest local elected union official may be dis-
missed by a corrupt union disciplinary board. 9 The history of organized crime
figures attempting to control local union presidencies indicates the likelihood of
this problem occurring in the future.9" Therefore, the Dolan court may have inad-
vertently weakened the democratic safeguards against union corruption.
THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
The Dolan decision poses a threat to union members rights9t and to the un-
ions. 92 Because of the busy docket of the United States Supreme Court,9 3 the
Court may be unable to clarify its opinion on the scope of section 101(a)(2) for a
considerable period of time. Recent analysis critical of the effectiveness of the
LMRDA in democratizing unions94 and the Senate report indicating that organ-
ized crime is still a significant force in labor unions" suggest that the time is ripe
for amending the LMRDA. Congress should take steps to protect the rights of
union members and the vitality of unions by passing legislation to protect the free
speech of elected local union officals. Congress could accomplish this by amend-
ing section 101(a)(2). The proposed legislation would mirror the language of sec-
tion 101(a)(2) except that the words "and local elected union officials" would
follow the words "labor organization" appearing at the beginning of section
101(a)(2). 96
Although the proposed amendment would not greatly change the structure of
section 101(a)(2), the amendment would have the significant impact of protecting
union members' rights and strengthening the LMRDA in achieving its goal of
85. Id. at 408. "The ultimate responsibility rests upon individual union members to insure that their
unions are efficiently and honestly run by taking a more active interest in the affairs of their
organization."
86. See Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Profile of Organized Crime: Mid-Atlantic Region, S.
REP. No. 548, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
87. Id. at 21.
88. Id. at 30.
89. A dismissal may be appealed to an International, but the International usually accepts and enforces
the governing board's decision. Id. at 30.
90. Id. at 29, 30.
91. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 44-69 and accompanying text.
93. In the terms completed last July, there were 5100 cases on the docket. Berger, The Time is Nowfor the
Intercircuit Panel, A.B.A.J., April 1985, at 87.
94. See Summers, Democracy in a One Party State, 43 MD. L. REV. 93 (1984). Summers claims that the
structure of unions remains more oligarchic than democratic.
95. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 86.
96. The amended statute would state:
Every member and local elected union officials shall have the right to meet and assemble
freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; business properly
before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to
the conduct of meetings. Provided that nothing herein shall be construed to impair the rights
of a labor organization to adopt and in force reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every
member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that
would interfere with its performance of its legal and contractual duties.
1985]
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democratizing unions. In addition, the amendment would make it more difficult
for corrupt union disciplinary boards to control local union presidencies.
CONCLUSION
In Dolan, the Eleventh Circuit held that local elected union officials may be
dismissed for excercising free speech. This precedent has serious implications
because local elected union officials must be allowed to speak freely without fear
of dismissal in order to adequately represent the views of their members. In addi-
tion, the dismissal of a local elected union official for exercising free speech under-
mines union democracy. Undemocratic unions easily become unresponsive to the
needs of workers and lose the strong support of union members that is necessary
for successful collective bargaining. Corruption also breeds with greater ease in
undemocratic unions. Therefore, the Dolan decision weakens the ability of the
LMRDA to eliminate union corruption and strengthen democracy in unions. In
light of the Dolan decision and the precedent it is based upon, Congress must
amend the LMRDA to protect the free speech of union officials in order to further
the original purposes of the Act.
William D. Brown*
* A.B., University of Southern California, 1983; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1986.
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